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Information Warfare targeting has long been a crucial, 
but unrecognized, part of military operations. From Sun 
Tzu’s targeting of the enemy’s will to fight, to today’s 
information-centric warfare, it is those who have 
understood the techniques and applications of Information 
Warfare targeting who have most often prevailed. As 
critical as it is to our success, it is a topic that is 
controversial, often misunderstood, and subject to various 
interpretations. 
This thesis examines the IW targeting process, 
consisting of people, information, systems, and the 
interaction between the function of targeting and IW. In 
the Information Age, IW has been recognized as viable 
warfare area. However, IW targeting cannot be treated as 
traditional targeting utilized by other warfare areas. This 
thesis is intended to serve as a guide for the study of 
this topic and provides an instructional program designed 
to satisfy the requirement for a coherent instructional 
program on IW Targeting. 
IW targeting affects every facet of warfare and in 
turn is affected by these facets. In preparing for a future 
that calls for maximizing the effects while minimizing the 
effort, it is critical that we understand the process in 
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1 
I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND  
Information Warfare targeting has long been a crucial, 
but unrecognized, part of military operations. From Sun 
Tzu’s targeting of the enemy’s will to fight, to today’s 
information-centric warfare, those who have understood and 
applied the techniques and tools of Information Warfare 
targeting are those who have most often prevailed. As 
critical as it is to our success, it is a topic that is 
controversial, often misunderstood, and subject to various 
interpretations. 
This thesis examines the Information Warfare targeting 
process, consisting of people, information, support 
systems, and the interaction between the functions of 
targeting. It is intended to serve as a guide for the study 
of this topic from a foundational standpoint by first 
exploring the doctrinal definitions used throughout DoD and 
developing a sense of what Information Warfare targeting is 
and is not. It then focuses on the components of the 
process and the dynamic relationships that exist between 
them. Finally, it attempts to develop a course of 
instruction aimed at the mid grade military officer, to 
facilitate the officer’s understanding of Information 
Warfare and the integration of Information Warfare into the 
targeting process. 
Information Warfare targeting affects every facet of 
warfare and, in turn, is affected by these facets. In 
preparing for a future that calls for maximizing the 
effects while minimizing the effort, it is critical that we 
understand the process in order to remain effective. 
2 
1. History of Targeting 
As presented in FM 90-36, traditional ideas of 
targeting have always been to destroy or neutralize a 
target with conventional weaponry. With neutralization 
becoming a euphemism for physically damaging the target so 
that it cannot function effectively. Though Sun Tzu has 
written about warfare utilizing other than destruction as a 
tool, history has shown from the days of Sun Tzu to modern 
day warfare that conventional weaponry and destruction seem 
to be the rule.  
The invention of gunpowder and the constant 
improvement of firearms are enough to show that 
the advance of civilization has done nothing 
practical to alter or deflect the impulse to 
destroy the enemy, which is the central idea of 
war.  – Clausewitz1 
The idea of targeting an enemy to achieve a specific effect 
has existed in past strategic philosophy. Sun Tzu states, 
“Thus, what is of supreme importance in war is to attack 
the enemy’s strategy.”2 Another example of this is from 
Captain Basil Liddell Hart, when he states, “The real 
target in war is the mind of the enemy commander, not the 
bodies of his troops.”3 The actual practice of targeting for 
an effect other than destruction or neutralization has been 
the exception, rather than the norm. Current ideas of 
effects based operations, as such effects based targeting, 
have always been in existence, however, the effects have 
usually been to either destroy or neutralize. The US 
military has excelled at this paradigm of conventional 
weaponry and destruction of the enemy. Only in the past 10-
15 years have “revolutionary” ideas in military affairs 
brought  forth  a new philosophy to explore alternate means 
3 
to achieve the objective. We will see that today the 
effects available to achieve the commander’s objectives 
have broadened in scope. 
2. New Paradigms 
With the formal recognition of Information Warfare 
and, more broadly Information Operations in DOD Directive 
3600.1, traditional ideas of targeting must be revisited. 
As stated in Joint Publication 3-13, Information Operations 
involve actions taken to affect adversary information and 
information systems while defending one’s own information 
and information systems.4 This line of thinking still relies 
on the old paradigm of targeting for destruction, only now 
the targets include the information and information 
systems. The underlying key idea that we must embrace is to 
go beyond the physical and look toward the effects, which 
this method of targeting entails. We will examine the new 
targets available, the new weapons, and tools to affect 
these new targets, with the key idea being to influence the 
enemy. As presented in Joint Publication 3-13, due to the 
old paradigms, IO targeting and planning have been 
disjointed and uncoordinated. IO targeting and plans have 
focused on the individual core competencies of IO without 
much consideration to other aspects of the operation or 
even the other core competencies. Targeting and planning 
“in a vacuum” is another old paradigm that must be set 
aside to fully realize the potential of an IO paradigm. The 
new paradigm seeks a coordinated effort of all the IO 
competencies in conjunction with all the other aspects of 
the operation to create a synergistic effect to achieve the 
objectives. The idea being, that the whole effect will be 




The purpose of this thesis is to address the central 
themes of Information Warfare targeting.  These themes 
include the idea of effects based targeting, current 
targeting processes and methodologies, and the integration 
of Information Warfare Targeting with traditional targeting 
processes. 
Currently, there does not exist a unifying 
instructional program that embodies the new paradigms of 
Information Warfare Targeting. During the conduct of 
research for this project, course material in the form of 
readings, slide presentations, and case studies was 
compiled for use in the classroom. Also, a course of 
instruction was developed to address these new paradigms. 
The purpose of this course is to direct the thinking of the 
students from traditional targeting paradigms to exploring 
potentially new options for planning, target selection, and 
target-weapon-effect matching. 
The entire course of instruction and supporting 
materials resides on Blackboard. Blackboard is an online 
aid to assist facilitation of a course. One objective is to 
be able to utilize Blackboard to facilitate distance 
learning. The rest of the material is located in a public 
folder and available on the classified SIPRnet LAN, at the 
Naval Postgraduate School. This document is intended to 
provide the reader an overview of topics and themes from 






This thesis is aimed at the mid-grade military officer 
with a basic understanding of Information Warfare/ 
Information Operations and operational staff experience. It 
will focus primarily on developing an understanding of 
Information Warfare targeting and how it relates to the 
overall targeting process. The intent is to expose the 
readers to the new effects defined in current doctrine and 
available through new technologies, and to discuss how the 
doctrine and technologies will impact the traditional 
objectives of targeting. The course material provided on 
these subjects will require periodic updating to maintain 
the relevance of the material in this dynamic field. Though 
the field of Information Warfare/Information Operations is 
broad in scope, we will limit the scope of this document to 
the specific aspects of targeting and target-weapon-effect 
matching. The documents used will cover the spectrum from 
joint and service specific publications to articles with a 
special emphasis placed on those concerned with 
theater/operational level Information Warfare targeting 
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II. INFORMATION WARFARE 
A. INFORMATION WARFARE CONCEPTS 
Information Warfare is Information Operations 
conducted during time of crisis or conflict to achieve or 
promote specific objectives over a specific adversary or 
adversaries.5 Information Operations involve actions taken 
to affect adversary information and information systems 
while defending one’s own information and information 
systems.6 Information Warfare can achieve effects in all 
other operational cultures, as such, it is also affected by 
those same operational areas. We will briefly cover the 
five core competencies (See Figure 1) and the supporting 
foundations of IW.  
INFORMATION OPERATION
Intelligence (Cryptology)

























































Figure 1.   IO Core Competencies and Foundations7 
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1. Electronic Warfare (EW) 
Electronic Warfare is any military action involving 
the use of electromagnetic and directed energy to control 
the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy.8 The 
electromagnetic spectrum is the medium through which 
information can be collected and disseminated. To affect 
the EM spectrum is to affect the information traveling 
across it. Therefore, EW affects information or information 
systems through its action on the EM spectrum or use of 
directed energy. 
a. Electronic Attack (EA) 
Electronic Attack involves actions taken to 
attack the adversary with the intent of degrading, 
neutralizing, or destroying adversary combat capability to 
prevent or reduce an adversary’s effective use of the 
electromagnetic spectrum.9 
b. Electronic Protect (EP) 
Electronic Protect involves such actions as self 
protection jamming and emission control taken to protect 
friendly use of the electromagnetic spectrum by minimizing 
the effects from friendly or adversary employment of EW 
that degrade, neutralize, or destroy friendly combat 
capability.10 
c. Electronic Warfare Support (ES) 
Electronic Warfare Support contributes to the 
situational awareness by detecting, identifying, and 
locating sources of intentional or unintentional radiated 
electromagnetic energy for the purpose of immediate threat 
recognition.11 ES further enhances IW by populating EW 
databases and providing baselines of adversary 
electromagnetic environment. 
9 
2. Computer Network Operation (CNO) 
From DODD 3600.1 and AFDD 2-5, Computer Network 
Operations involves action taken to affect or exploit 
adversary computer systems, networks, and data while 
defending one’s own computer systems, networks and data. As 
an increasing amount of information needed to conduct 
warfare resides, in the form of data, on adversary and 
friendly computer systems and networks, Computer Network 
Operation plays an increasingly important role as a core 
competency in Information Warfare. 
a. Computer Network Attack (CNA) 
Computer Network Attack involves actions to gain 
access to a computer or computer network for the purpose of 
attacking the data, the processes, or the hardware. This 
may involve the use of Denial of Service (DOS) attacks, 
malicious code implantation, data modification, and data 
fabrication. 
b. Computer Network Defense (CND) 
Computer Network Defense involves actions taken 
to protect one’s own computer and computer network from 
attack and exploitation by the adversary.  
c. Computer Network Exploitation (CNE) 
Computer Network Exploitation involves actions 
taken to exploit an adversary’s computer and computer 
network. The exploitation takes the form of remote digital 
surveillance, system probing, data acquisition and ex-
filtration, and gaining access for future exploitation or 
attack. 
3. Psychological Operations (PSYOP) 
Psychological Operations involve actions taken to 
convey a selected message to a target audience, in the 
target audience’s native language, to induce a behavior 
10 
that supports friendly objectives.12  In the first Gulf War, 
the US military effectively utilized PSYOP. The leaflet 
campaign in conjunction with synchronized B-52 strikes 
induced surrender amongst the Iraqi troops. Eventually, the 
leaflets had sufficient credibility to cause the Iraqi 
troops to abandon their position without actual strikes. 
4. Military Deception (MILDEC) 
Military Deception involves actions taken to convey a 
selected perception to a target’s intelligence collection 
and dissemination assets for the purpose of causing 
adversary commanders to form inaccurate impressions about 
friendly force capabilities and intentions.13 Using the 
example presented in the PSYOP section above, the MILDEC 
operation in the first Gulf War convinced the Iraqi troops 
that an amphibious assault was imminent at Kuwait. The 
displays of amphibious assault exercises off of Saudi 
Arabian and the demonstrations of the coast of Kuwait on 
the night of the actual attack into Iraq, influenced the 
adversary commanders to misallocate their forces to our 
benefit.    
5. Operations Security (OPSEC) 
From Joint Publication 3-54, Operations Security 
involves actions taken to protect or hide friendly 
unclassified and observable indicators from adversary 
intelligence collection efforts. The purpose of OPSEC is to 
prevent adversary intelligence from discerning friendly 
critical information, such as capabilities and intentions. 
A historical example of OPSEC in practice goes back to the 
Vietnam era. B-52’s flew bombing missions over North 
Vietnam to virtually no effect. The adversary seem to 
figure out the times and targets of these bombing missions. 
Apparently, the targets were abandoned by the time they 
11 
were serviced by the B-52’s. A team was assigned to 
determine where the compromises had occurred. It was found 
that all B-52 crews filed international flight plans. The 
adversary intelligence agents were able to gain access and 
analyze these flight plans. Based on this gathered 
information, the adversary was able to determine the target 
of that particular mission and the time over the target. 
The team recommended that all B-52 crews file the same 
flight plan and use the same entrance corridors to Vietnam 
airspace. The procedural change increased the effectiveness 
of each subsequent bombing mission.  
6. Supporting or Foundational Competencies 
As studied in Joint Publication 3-13, Supporting 
Competencies are elements through which their action will 
have a supporting role to the effects of the five core 
competencies. These competencies are Physical Destruction, 
Special Information Operations (also known as Special 
Technical Operations), Public Affairs, Civil Affairs, 
Intelligence supported by Cryptology, and C4 (Command and 
Control, Computers and Communications). Though this list is 
not all-inclusive, it does cover the primary recognized 
supporting competencies.  
Physical Destruction involves actions taken to 
physically destroy or damage a specified target in support 
of the objectives. From the Joint IO Planning Handbook, 
this may involve the use of munitions or Special Forces’ 
direct actions.  
Special Information Operations involves the use of 
classified programs to achieve a specific effect on a 
target. 
12 
Public Affairs involves informing and educating the US 
public audience and international community on US 
operations and activities. This is achieved by providing 
selected factual information to the media and public with 
the intent on informing and educating. 
Civil Affairs involves actions taken to reconstitute 
the native infrastructure of an operational area. 
Typically, the activities associated with Civil Affairs are 
the reconstruction of the infrastructure, economy, and 
basic services. This also includes humanitarian efforts to 
assist the local populace. 
Intelligence, supported by Cryptology, is part of the 
foundation on which the five core competencies rest. 
Intelligence collects and provides the information 
necessary to conduct IW planning, targeting, and mission 
assessment. 
C4 is the other part of the foundation on which the 
five core competencies rest. C4 provides the primary 
conduit through which all planning and execution must be 
coordinated and conducted.  
7. Related Competencies 
A controversial related competency is IW/IO Law and 
resides within the Inspector Generals/Judge Advocate 
Generals Community. The primary difficulty in this area is 
precedence. The new paradigms and technologies have brought 
forth new legal problems and ramifications. Rules of 
Engagement define how a conflict will be conducted and the 
legal support for those engagements. Legal interpretation 
by the legal community will have a tremendous impact as to 
how we will be able to conduct IO. 
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B. INFORMATION WARFARE TARGET SETS 
Targets, as traditionally defined in Joint Publication 
3-60, have been used to identify a geographical area, a 
complex, an installation, equipment or personnel to be 
serviced by conventional weaponry in support of the 
commander’s objectives.  Traditional IO targets have always 
been personnel, specifically the adversary decision makers, 
adversary commanders, troops, and the adversary populace. 
These targets were serviced by OPSEC, MILDEC, PSYOP, and 
Physical Destruction (with the emphasis placed on 
destruction). OPSEC targets are defined as adversary 
intelligence collection, which include observers and spies. 
MILDEC targets are defined as the adversary decision makers 
and commanders. PSYOP targets are defined as the adversary 
decision makers, commanders, troops, and populace. Since 
World War II and the advent of radar technology, EW has 
been a counter to radar. EW targets being defined as 
primarily radars and limited radio communications links.  
With the realization of Information Operations, 
information and information systems are now considered 
targets. The scope of IW targets has expanded beyond 
traditional targets as defined by the Joint Targeting 
Process. IW targets can now be described by using a generic 
system model (see Figure 2) or a links and nodes model (see 
Figure 3). Any component in those models is a viable target 









Figure 3.   Links and Nodes System Model14 
 
We will examine the new target sets available to 
Information Warfare planner through current technologies. 
With new target sets available, a new classification system 
for these targets has been introduced. The four categories 
15 
are hardware, software, wetware, and information.15 We will 
examine these new classifications and how they apply to the 
targets of the core competencies. Though the targets 
mentioned here may not seem valid, their validity in the 
next section, IW Tools and Weapons Systems. 
1. Hardware 
Hardware is defined in the Joint IO Planning Handbook 
as a physical target, specifically equipment, facilities, 
support systems, and information systems. OPSEC’s target 
sets within the hardware category are primarily the 
equipment or systems used by the adversary for intelligence 
collection and surveillance. This equipment can be as 
innocuous as a camera or as sophisticated as dedicated 
reconnaissance vehicles and satellites. MILDEC’s target 
sets within the hardware category are similar to OPSEC’s; 
though the objective is to deceive/mislead vice deny 
critical information. EW’s target sets within the hardware 
category are subcategorized into radars, communications, 
and electronics. Radars have been the classical targets of 
EW. Communications have now become a more viable target. 
The HF through EHF frequencies are now vulnerable to EW 
effects. This means that radio communications (including 
wireless devices), microwave links, satellite uplink and 
downlinks are all potentially vulnerable. Electronics is 
the catch-all category. This category includes any device 
with electronic circuitry or processing chip not included 
in the previous subcategories. CNO’s target sets within the 
hardware category are any computer or computer networking 
equipment. 
2. Software 
Software is defined in the Joint IO Planning Handbook 
as the data or program instruction needed by a device in 
16 
order to operate. EW’s target set within the software 
category is the data integrity. CNO’s target sets within 
the software category are the data integrity and data 
authenticity.  
3. Wetware 
Wetware is defined in the Joint IO Planning Handbook 
as the people and the minds of those people. OPSEC’s target 
sets within the wetware category are intelligence analysts 
and the decision makers. MILDEC’s target sets are the same 
as for OPSEC. PSYOP’ target sets within the wetware 
category are decision makers, governments, organizations, 
groups, troops, and the general populace. EW’s target sets 
include military and civilian personnel for the purpose of 
non-lethal engagement of potentially hostile personnel. 
CNO’s target set is the computer operator.  
4. Information 
As presented in Information Warfare and Security, 
information is defined as data interpreted within a 
specified context to give meaning to the data. OPSEC’s 
target set is the adversary intelligence requirements, 
specifically friendly critical information. MILDEC’s target 
set is the adversary’s preconceived perception of friendly 
capabilities and intentions. PSYOP’ target set is the 
presentation of information content and context. EW’s 
target set within the information category is the integrity 
of the information. CNO’s target sets are content, 
integrity, and authenticity. 
 
C. INFORMATION WARFARE TOOLS AND WEAPON SYSTEMS 
The progress of technology has not only brought forth 
the broadening scope of IW targets, but has also ushered in 
17 
new weapons and tools to affect those targets. We will 
examine the traditional weapons of the five competencies of 
Information Warfare. We will also examine the new weapons 
available to Information Warfare planner through current 
technologies.  
1. OPSEC 
From Joint Publication 3-54, traditional OPSEC tools 
are the OPSEC Survey, awareness training, print media, and 
procedural or organizational changes. The OPSEC Survey is a 
tool used by OPSEC practitioners to determine OPSEC status 
of an organization or operation. This survey is completed 
by the members of an organization or operation. It seeks to 
determine where observable, identifiable indicators, which 
may expose critical information, exist. Once these 
indicators have been identified, a risk analysis is 
performed to examine the cost of countermeasures versus the 
benefit provided by those countermeasures. When 
countermeasures are viable, they are implemented. These 
countermeasures are typically in the form of procedural or 
organizational changes. Awareness training is conducted to 
maintain the OPSEC readiness of an organization or 
operation. Print media in the form of security posters, 
flyers, and organizational newsletters. With new 
technologies, the scope of the media has expanded to 
electronic communications, (email, screensavers, etc.).  
Also posters and flyers provided for awareness. 
2. MILDEC 
From Joint Publication 3-58, traditional MILDEC tools 
can be classified into three different categories; 
physical, technical, and administrative. Physical tools 
include displays, feints, demonstrations, and ruses. 
Physical tools rely on actual maneuvers or actions by 
18 
friendly forces. Technical tools include camouflage, 
shapes, radar reflectors, decoys, false communications 
networks, and false radar emissions. Administrative tools 
include a staged compromise or loss of classified 
documents, as described in WWII allied operation 
“Mincemeat” and discussed in the book “The Man Who Never 
Was” by Ewen Montagu. With new technologies, the 
traditional tools of MILDEC are still applicable.  
3. PSYOP 
As described in FM 33-1-1, traditional PSYOP tools can 
be divided into two broad categories; media and delivery 
platforms. Media is the medium in which a PSYOP message is 
delivered. Media can be further subcategorized into 
audiovisual, visual, audio, and personal. Audiovisual media 
can be characterized as media delivery both sight and 
sound. Examples of audiovisual media are television and 
motion pictures. Visual media are media which delivers its 
message by sight only. Examples of this are leaflets, 
pamphlets, posters, books, and art. Audio media delivers 
its message through sound. Examples are radio and 
loudspeakers. Personal media is face-to-face communications 
with the intended audience. Delivery platforms are 
equipment or vehicles which utilize one category of media 
to deliver the PSYOP message. Delivery platforms and the 
associated media are listed below in Table 1. New PSYOP 
tools and weapons available are Transportable AM-FM Radio 
Broadcasting Station (TARBS) and Hypersonics/Audio 
Spotlight. TARBS is a deployable broadcast station, which 
can be placed on ships to serve as an afloat or ashore 
broadcasting station. Hypersonics is a recent development 
in speaker technology. It employs the use of ultrasonic 
waves modulated by audible sound waves to transmit sound. 
19 
When the ultrasound collides with an object, the distortion 
caused by the impact demodulates the audible sound waves. 
The localize demodulation creates sound in the immediate 
area of the object. The scope of this technology as it 
pertains to PSYOP is great. Now, a PSYOP message can be 
delivered with pinpoint accuracy at a target. Audio 
Spotlight is the consumer product line utilizing this 
technology. 
4. EW 
From Joint Publication 3-51, traditional EW tools and 
weapons are jammers and decoys. EW jammers transmit 
electronic noise on the frequency of the radar being 
targeted. Communications jammers transmit noise on 
communications frequencies (HF-VHF-UHF). Traditional decoys 
are chaff, radar reflectors, and flares. Chaff is a fine 
strip of radar reflective material cut to a length 
optimized for certain radar frequencies. Radar reflectors 
are expendable decoys, which attempt to reflect a larger 
amount of radar energy than the platform it is protecting. 
Flares are decoys designed to defeat infrared systems.  
As described in Electronic Warfare in the Information 
Age, new technology has brought new tools, techniques, and 
weapons. EW jammers are no longer limited to noise jamming. 
Recent EW jammers are capable of Deceptive Electronic 
Countermeasures (DECM). DECM is a technique to receive 
radar energy, manipulate the waveform, and transmit a 
jamming signal optimized to defeat that radar system. 
Communications jammers have also been updated to be able to 
transmit specific waveforms. 
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Delivery Platform Media Utilized 
Portable Transmitters Audio: AM-FM Radio 
Audiovisual: Television 
Ground Vehicles Audio: Loudspeakers, AM-FM Radio 
Audiovisual: Television 
Helicopters Audio: Loudspeakers, AM-FM Radio 
Audiovisual: Television 
Visual: Leaflets 
Aircraft (Temporary Set Up) Audio: AM-FM Radio 
Audiovisual: Television  
Visual: Leaflets 
M129 Leaflet Bombs Visual: Leaflets 
Leaflet Boxes Visual: Leaflets (dropped by 
Helicopter or Aircraft) 
EC-130E Commando Solo Audio: AM-FM Radio 
Audiovisual: Television 
Troops Personal: Civil Affairs 
Visual: Leaflets, Pamphlets 
Various Product Production 
System 
All 
Note: Detailed descriptions available in FM-33-1-1. 
 
Table 1.   PSYOP Delivery Platforms (from FM-33-1-1) 
 
Also described in Electronic Warfare in the 
Information Age, in addition to traditional decoys, 
electronic decoys are now available. These electronic 
decoys transmit electronic signature of the platform they 
are protecting. Traditional flares have been upgraded and 
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augmented. Flares are now capable of specific frequencies 
of infrared to counter filters implemented by offensive 
infrared systems. There are now active infrared defense 
systems to augment the flares.  
One of the newest developments in EW is High Powered 
Microwave devices (HPMs) or High Energy Radio Frequency 
devices (HERFs). HPMs/HERFs generate high-powered emissions 
to destroy electronic circuitry. The E-Bomb or more 
accurately named conventional electromagnetic pulse bomb 
generates a short duration high-energy pulse, similar to 
the EMP effects from a high altitude nuclear detonation. 
HPMs have also been used to target personnel. These HPMs 
cause intolerable pain to the target in order to persuade 
the target to take other less offensive actions.  
New pseudo-EW weapons, which also target personnel, 
are the sonic weapons. Sonic weapons are potentially non-
lethal weapons, which can have similar effects as the HPMs, 
incapacitate their target personnel. Hypersonics, mentioned 
earlier in the PSYOP section, is a potential weapon against 
troop. With hypersonics, friendly forces can shoot a 
pinpoint beam of sound in excess of 150 yards. The sound 
heard at the target location can be set to 145 dB, which is 
50 times the threshold of pain for humans. Though sonic 
weapons are not technically EW weapons, we include them 
here because of their similarity. 
5. CNO 
CNO has no historical weapons due to its relative 
recent introduction (last 5-10 years). We will examine CNO 
tools and weapons in a logical sequence. First, we will 
look at tools for CNE. CNE will lead us into CNA tools. We 
will forego CND tools, as our focus is to target 
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offensively. Our primer for this study into CNO and its 
elements will be Hacking Exposed, Third Edition, 2002. One 
caveat to this is we will assume all activities will be 
conducted online. A second caveat is that all examples 
discussed here are widely available, non-military tools. 
This is to preserve the classification and distribution of 
this study.  
CNE tools have varying complexity and intrusiveness. 
The least intrusive is an internet search engine, such as 
Google, WebCrawler, Whois, etc. The next tools are domain 
register search engines such as Sam Spade. These tools 
provide greater detail of the intended target’s computer 
systems and networks. The next step is scanning tools. 
Scanning tools allow us to map the target’s computer 
network. These tools include Nmap and Superscan. Next, we 
need to determine the specifics of individual components of 
the network. The enumeration tools are DumpSec, NAT10, and 
Legion. We have now reached the juxtaposition between CNE 
and CNA. This border is defined by intent. If the intention 
is to only exploit, then you remain in CNE. However, if the 
intention is to alter data, deny access, change 
configuration, or plant destructive code, then from Joint 
Publication 3-13, you have crossed into CNA. Additional 
tools to gain and elevate access onto a network are 
TCPDump, L0phtcrack, TFTP, NetCat, etc. 
CNA tools can be divided into five general categories; 
data altering, cleaning, backdoors, denial of service, and 
malicious codes. Data altering tools include text editors, 
file editors, file command functions, and address 
resolution protocol (ARP) table protocol manipulators. 
Cleaning tools remove any record of your activity on the 
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network. Some tools are rootkits (Back Orifice and 
SubSeven), text editors, file editors, registry editors, 
and file command functions. Backdoor tools create alternate 
access to the system or network. Denials of Service (DOS) 
tools deny service to the targeted system’s users. Some of 
these tools are Synk4, Ping of Death, Smurf Attack, 
Supernuke.exe. Malicious code tools are tools that create 
malicious code or the code itself. The codes are classified 
as worms, virus, Trojan horses, logic bombs, etc. A more 
extensive list of tools and techniques can be found in 


















































A. TRADITIONAL TARGETING 
Traditional targeting processes and methodologies are 
best described in Joint Publication 3-60 and FM 90-36 
TARGETING: Joint Targeting Process and Procedures for 
Targeting Time-Critical Targets developed by the Air Land 
Sea Application Center. This document is the primary source 
for further exploration into the Joint Targeting Process. 
In order to understand Joint Targeting, we must first 
define a target. As stated previously, a target can be a 
geographical area, a complex, an installation, equipment or 
personnel. The Joint Targeting Process exists because of 
the need to deconflict targeting operations, prevent 
duplication of effort, and reduce the potential for 
fratricide and collateral damage in a dynamic battlespace 
environment. The Joint Targeting Process must ensure the 
following: 
1) Compliance with the Commander’s guidance and 
objectives. 
2) Coordination, deconfliction, and synchronization 
of all targeting efforts. 
3) Prevent fratricide. 
4) Minimize collateral damage. 
5) Minimize duplication of effort. 
6) Control tasking for mutually accessible targets. 
7) Provide expeditious combat assessments. 
8) Provide a common perspective for all of the 
targeting effort. 
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The primary goals of the Joint Targeting Process are to 
ensure the most efficient use of joint force assets and to 
capitalize on synergistic effects. The Joint Targeting 
Process is a set of function, steps, and actions required 
to conduct Joint Targeting.  The Joint Targeting Process is 
a six phase cyclical process shown in Figure 4.  
 
Figure 4.   The Joint Targeting Process16 
 
Also shown in Figure 4 is the Army and Marine Corps four-
step targeting methodology, Decide-Detect-Deliver-Assess. 
This joint targeting process determines the employment of 
military force to achieve a desired objective and is driven 
by the commander’s objectives and guidance.  
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1. Commander’s Objectives, Guidance, and Intent 
From FM 90-36 and the Joint IO Planning Handbook, the 
commander’s objectives are his/her desired position, 
outcome, or purpose of the operation. The commander’s 
guidance is the framework for employing theater assets to 
achieve the objective. The commander’s intent is his/her 
plan to achieve the objective. Good objectives and guidance 
have 3 characteristics. They are clear, measurable, and 
attainable. They also include an articulation of damage 
levels, desired states, and period of operation. 
2. Target Development 
From Joint Publication 3-60 and FM 90-36, Target 
Development Phase is the systematic evaluation of potential 
target systems, individual targets, and the element of each 
target. There are three basic targeting criteria: 
criticality, accessibility, and vulnerability. Criticality 
is the relative importance to attaining the commander’s 
objective and/or the relative importance as the target 
relates to other systems. Accessibility is ease with which 
friendly forces or munitions are able to physically get to 
the target. Vulnerability is the target’s vulnerability to 
the effects of the munitions or forces used against it. 
3. Weaponeering Assessment 
From FM 90-36, Weaponeering Assessment Phase provides 
various force application options for each target based on 
the desired effect. This assessment is based on an analysis 
of the target’s characteristics and vulnerabilities. 
Weaponeering assessment determines the quantity, type, and 
mix of lethal and non-lethal options required to achieve 




4. Force Application 
From FM 90-36, Force application phase combines the 
results of the weaponeering assessment with the available 
force to deliver them. This phase seeks to optimize force 
employment to minimize effort. The key products from the 
force application phase are the Master Air Attack Plan/Air 
Tasking Orders and the Master Ground Attack Plan/Attack 
Guidance Matrix. 
5. Execution Planning and Force Execution 
From FM 90-36, Execution Planning involves the conduct 
of mission planning for each individual element and 
preparations for engagements. This portion of the phase 
involves scheduling, mission assignments, routes, and 
tactics. 
Force Execution involves executing the planned 
missions and monitoring the operation. This is typically a 
component commander function and includes real-time 
recommendation, redirection of forces, re-attack 
assignments.  
6. Combat Assessment 
From FM 90-36, Combat assessment determines the 
overall effectiveness of force employment and whether the 
commander’s objectives are being met. This is primarily an 
intelligence function and includes: battle damage 
assessment (BDA), munitions effectiveness assessment (MEA), 
bomb hit assessment (BHA), and re-attack recommendation. 






B. INFORMATION WARFARE TARGETING 
Information Warfare targeting is based on the current 
Joint Targeting Process. With IW targeting and planning, 
this study has discovered that the traditional timelines 
used by the Joint Targeting process must be reevaluated. 
This study will also examine IW targeting in the context of 
the traditional targeting process.  
1. Commander’s Objectives, Guidance, and Intent 
Based on Joint Publication 3-60, the commander’s 
objective, guidance, and intent apply the same as in the 
traditional targeting process. However, it must now be 
interpreted by the IW staff into IW objectives and tasks. 
After coming to a full understanding of the commander’s 
objectives, guidance, and intent, the IW staff must fully 
understand the adversary. The key is to understand the 
adversary’s perspective. Understanding the adversary’s 
perspective will lead to the IO objectives and desired 
effects as described in the Joint IO Planning Handbook.  
2. Target Development 
Based on the Joint IO Planning Handbook, in IW target 
development, we must conduct a systematic evaluation of the 
adversary’s information and information systems. This 
evaluation must take into account the four IW target 
categories hardware, software, wetware, and information. We 
can use the links and nodes relational model to evaluate 
these targets. As presented in the Joint IO Planning 
Handbook, we must understand the significance of the 
information to the adversary, how that information will be 
used, the information systems that process the information, 
the flow of that information through the adversary systems, 
and vulnerabilities associated with the entire system. Once 
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we understand the relationship between the various nodes 
and the links, which carry the information, we can identify 
targets within the system. From the identified targets, we 
select targets and desired effects, which will contribute 
to achieving the IO objectives. 
3. Capability Analysis (Weaponeering Assessment) 
From the Joint IO Planning Handbook and Joint 
Publication 3-60, capability analysis17, which is the 
equivalent to weaponeering assessment, examines the targets 
selected in the target development phase and identify which 
of the IO competencies (core and supporting) will be most 
effective in achieving the desired effect. This may involve 
the application of multiple competencies and other warfare 
areas. From the identified competencies, we will select the 
tools or weapons that will best achieve the desired effect, 
which can be lethal or non-lethal. The final product being 
a weapon/tool-target-effect matching. In addition, clear 
measures of effectiveness (MOEs) must be established in 
order to determine whether the objectives have been 
achieved, as stated in the Joint IO Planning Handbook. 
4. Force Application 
In IW force application, we take the results of the 
capability analysis and assign available forces for 
execution. Like traditional force application, IW force 
application seeks to optimize force employment and minimize 
effort. However, from Joint Publication 3-13, what is more 
critical is the synchronization of effort in order to 
capitalize on synergistic effects. This synchronization is 
best described by using perception management. Using PSYOP 
to influence the adversary to reinforce a preconceived 
notion of friendly forces and MILDEC to further reinforce 
what the adversary is expecting to see and hear. OPSEC then 
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protects the real operation. The synchronization of these 
efforts produce an effect much greater than neither could 
have achieved alone. One of the best examples is the 
amphibious feint in the first Gulf War. PSYOP reinforced 
the Iraqi notion that the US Marines were legendary combat 
troops. Military Deception produced displays of amphibious 
exercises and a feint into Kuwait, while OPSEC concealed 
the true troop movement to the west. 
5. Mission Planning and Execution 
From Joint Publication 3-60 and the Joint IO Planning 
Handbook, IW Mission Planning and Execution is the same as 
traditional execution planning and force execution. IW 
forces will conduct the detail planning and execution of 
the mission to deliver the weapon or tool to the adversary 
targets. 
6. Combat Assessment 
From the Joint IO Planning Handbook, Combat Assessment 
is also the same as traditional combat assessment. The 
criteria for success or failure are compared to the MOEs 
established in the capability analysis phase. Intelligence 
collection may require long-term analysis to determine the 
efficacy of IW effects. Intelligence collection may also 
require analysis of related or secondary system to 
determine the achievement of IW objectives.  
 
C. COMPARE AND CONTRAST TARGETING CONCEPTS 
In this section, we will examine the difference in 
traditional targeting and Information Warfare Targeting. We 
will study the inherent advantages and disadvantages of 
integrating these two processes.  
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The advantages of traditional targeting process when 
applied to IW are: 
1) For list numbering, use either n. or n) but not 
n.).The process is standardized and familiar to all 
planning staffs and services. Familiarity instills 
confidence. 
2) The process has a relatively short cycle times. 
Typically, it coincides with the 72 hours Air Tasking Order 
(ATO) generation process. 
3) It is very effective with conventional targets, 
because it was designed around conventional weaponry. 
The disadvantages of traditional targeting processes 
when applied to IW are: 
1) Only one universally recognized target 
identification and reference system. This system is 
designed specifically for conventional targets. 
2) Procedures for the Joint Target Coordination 
Board (JTCB) and the Guidance, Apportionment, and Targeting 
(GAT) Cell vary between theaters of operation. 
3) Joint Doctrine does not explain how to perform 
actual targeting. 
4) Current tactics, techniques, and procedures do 
not outline the specifics of targeting. 
The advantages of a unique IW targeting process are: 
1) It is designed for IW. 
2) It is based on the traditional targeting process. 
3) It is synchronized to capitalize on synergistic 
effects. 
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The disadvantages of a unique IW targeting process 
are: 
1) The planning staffs and services are less 
familiar with IW concepts. 
2) Paradigm shifts are usually met with resistance 
initially. 
3) The timelines for planning, execution, and combat 
assessment vary among the IW competencies. Some 
competencies require long lead times for execution and 
combat assessment. 
The advantages of integrating the two processes are: 
1) It will permit other warfare areas to coordinate 
with IW efforts to maximize the advantages of effects based 
operation through synchronization of the effort. 
2) It will allow for synergistic effect between IW 
and the other warfare areas. It will allow IW to act as a 
force multiplier for the other warfare areas and it allows 
the other warfare areas to lend credence to the IW efforts. 
The disadvantages of integrating the two processes 
are: 
1) The timeline variation in IW planning, execution, 
and combat assessment will add complexity to the targeting 
process. IW, as a whole, cannot abide by the ATO generation 
timeline. 
2) All the disadvantages, to varying degrees, listed 
for the traditional targeting process and for the IW 
targeting process. 
The payoff for overcoming these disadvantages is the 
optimization of force employment, “munitions” expenditure, 
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and effects to achieve the objectives. Other payoffs are 
the alleviation of risk to forces, shortening the duration 
of the conflict, and minimizing the cost of the conflict. 
The payoff is best stated in the following: 
Properly executed, IO could have halved the length of 
the campaign…  
Admiral James O. Ellis, United States Navy 
Commander-in-Chief, US Naval Forces Europe 
Commander, Allied Forces Southern Europe 
Commander, Joint Task Force NOBIL ANVIL 





















IV. INFORMATION WARFARE TARGETING COURSE 
DEVELOPMENT 
A. COURSE RESEARCH 
The research conducted for this document was also used 
in the creation of the Naval Postgraduate School’s IW 
Targeting Course, IW3920. All of the reference documents 
listed in the reference section of this document were used 
in the preparation of the course. The focus of the course 
research was from a joint combatant command perspective. A 
course review was done on IW courses and IW targeting 
courses offered by the individual services and the Joint 
Forces Staff College. These courses (shown in Table 2) were 
examined for their insight and guidance on the creation of 
this course.  
Organization Course Examined 
Joint Forces Staff College Joint Information Warfare 
Staff and Operations Course 
Air Force Special 
Operations School 
Special Operations Forces 
Information Operations Planner 
Course 
Air Force Information 
Warfare Center 
IW Applications Course 
Fleet Information Warfare 
Center 
Naval Information Warfare 
Staff and Operations Course 
1st IO Command 




Table 2.   Courses Examined for Research 
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B. COURSE DEVELOPMENT 
We developed a course that provides the foundations of 
the target planning processes as it applies to Information 
Warfare. The previous course was heavily focused on the 
technical aspects of targeting. The course that we 
developed replaces the previous course with a more rounded 
treatment of IW. Each core competency of Information 
Warfare is studied and targeting concepts are applied.  
The idea is to convey to the students the art of 
information warfare targeting through lecture, course work, 
practical examples, and hands-on analysis. One difficulty 
with the course development was to ensure the proper scope 
of material could be covered without overlapping other 
coursework. This problem was due to the pre-requisite class 
of IW3101 and the follow-on class of IO4300. The solution 
was to tread carefully between the two and minimize the 
overlap of the material. In IW3101, the students learned 
the fundamental theories behind IW. In IO4300, the students 
learned to incorporate those theories into operational 
planning. The solution was to focus on the practical 
targeting aspects of IW. The goal is to educate students on 
the art and science of IW targeting and the potential 
applications of IW tools for a desired effect. 
To achieve this goal, we used an approach involving 
the idea of using the links and nodes relationship model, 
also known as nodal analysis. Targeting the links or the 
nodes was the premise behind this course development. The 
idea is to teach the student to place a target or system in 
a framework that will facilitate evaluation of that target 
or system. We covered the intelligence requirement to 
analyze the links and nodes targeting model for each IW 
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core competency. Finally, we covered the application of 
weapons and tools for each competency to show the effects 
that can be achieved. We took the five core competencies 
and allowed three days of lecture for each competency. The 
first day covers the links and nodes relationship for that 
particular competency and the analysis required for target 
selection. The second day focuses on the intelligence 
requirements to analyze the relational model and the 
sources of this intelligence. The third day examines the 
weapons and tools needed to achieve the desired effects on 
the selected target. 
As most of the students had little or no exposure on 
planning or targeting, it was necessary to expose them to 
the Joint Operations Planning and Execution System (JOPES) 
and the Joint Targeting Cycle. It was also necessary to 
cover the joint targeting process in detail.  
Perception Management is an overarching term for the 
collection of PSYOP, MILDEC, and OPSEC. After each of these 
competencies was covered, the synergistic effect of these 
three competencies working in concert was illustrated. 
Supporting and related competencies are vital to the 
success of IW. Additional lectures were included to show 
the effects of these competencies on the core competencies. 
Two lectures were required to show how all of these 
competencies work synergistically. 
Lab time was used to provide guest speakers, who are 
subject matter experts, to discuss targeting in their 
particular IW competency (see Table 3). Lab time was also 
designed  to  give  the  students  hands-on experience with 
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IW/IO planning tools available to staff planners, such as 
IO Navigator (ION) and Information Warfare Planning 
Capability (IWPC). 
The efficacy of the material was measured by weekly 
quizzes, a research paper, and a final class project. 
Quizzes consisted of multiple choice, fill-in-the-blank, 
and short essay questions. The research paper provided the 
students an opportunity to delve into a specific IW 
targeting topic. The final class project provides the best 
measure whether the material was being sufficiently 
understood by the students. 
 
C. COURSE PLAN 
 The material derived from this research and course 
development effort was used to create an 11-week graduate 
level course. We also adapted this course to electronic 
media to facilitate distance learning by mid-grade officers 
unable to physically attend due to operational commitments. 
The course plan shown on Table 3 displays the schedule 
developed for this course. A grading policy was established 
with the following breakdown: Final Class Project – 40%, 
Quizzes – 30%, Research Paper – 20%, and Class 
Participation – 10%. This policy was developed to give more 
weight to the final class project than the other aspects of 
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Table 3.   IW3920 Course Schedule for Spring 2003 
 
D. COURSE PRESENTATION 
This course was presented to the current Information 
Warfare Curriculum students to evaluate the efficacy of 
this instructional program and its material. Course is 
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designed to be a three lecture hours and two lab hours per 
week. The course was presented to the class in accordance 
with the course plan shown in Table 3.  
The Blackboard learning support system was used for 
class administration. Blackboard is a tool available at 
many graduate institutions. This tool provides a forum for 
the students to retrieve course documents (syllabus, slide 
presentation, homework assignments, etc.), take exams, 
examine their grades, submit their work, and communicate 
with classmates and the instructor. This tool is ideal for 
distance learning application.   
One aspect of grading was the weekly quizzes, which 
were administered via Blackboard. The weekly quizzes were 
designed to gauge the progress of the students. A second 
aspect of grading was the research paper. The research 
paper was assigned during the fourth week to allow the 
students to study a facet of IW that was of interest to him 
or her. The final project was the culmination of the entire 
course and allowed the students to apply what they have 
learned. For the final class project, the students selected 
a country or organization of interest to them, analyzed 
that country or organization, selected targets, determined 
the desired effects, and applied IW against those targets. 
Then, the students briefed their classmates on their 
project. The intent was for the students to select an 
objective and analyze the problem, meet the chosen 
objective, and present their ideas. This final project 
illustrated that the students understood the material and 
that they had learned innovative thinking about the 
possibilities for the application of IW.  
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E. STUDENT FEEDBACK AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The class consisted of 12 students; six USN Officers, 
three USMC Officers, and three USA Officers. Nine students 
were in the IW Curriculum and three were in the ISO 
Curriculum. Overall impression from the students was 
positive. The entire class thought that it was worthwhile 
and value-added to their understanding of IW and IW 
targeting. Some felt the course was similar to IW 
Fundamentals, IW 3101. Feedback was solicited from the 
students upon completion of the course. 
The students provided feedback and recommendations on 
course material.  Most students were pleased to get 
exposure to the JOPES planning process, as they had not 
seen it before. The only exception was an officer who had 
staff planning experience. This exception was an anomaly 
rather than the norm. All the students felt the study of 
the joint targeting process was beneficial to their 
understanding of targeting. The students were especially 
enthusiastic about the links and nodes relationship model 
and the framework it provided for IW targeting. 
Students also provided feedback on testing and 
grading. Some students did not like weekly quizzes and 
prefer weekly papers. Most thought the quizzes were fair 
and covered the relevant material for those lecture 
periods. All of the students found the grading policy to be 
fair. 
The students provided feedback on the final project as 
well. The students felt that the final class project lacked 
guidance. Specifically, the students commented that there 
was a lack of a commander’s objective and guidance. They 
were unsure of the content of the product they were being 
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asked to produce. This feedback has been used to improve 





V. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
As presented in The Principles of War in the 
Information Age, the paradigm shift that is occurring in 
targeting and in military affairs is a result of the 
Information revolution. Conventional weaponry and 
destruction are no longer the only means of affecting the 
adversary. Recognition of IW as a warfare area is a sign of 
this change. IW can achieve objectives without crossing the 
borders of an adversary. From the National Strategy to 
Secure Cyberspace, in cyberspace, there are no borders. IW 
can influence the behavior of the adversary, so the 
objective can be achieved without having to bring 
conventional weapons to bear. However, IW is still an 
unfamiliar territory for some in the military and IW 
targeting is equally unfamiliar. We must integrate IW 
targeting with the traditional targeting process to 
facilitate IW’s contribution to the combatant commander’s 
effort. An IW Targeting Course can alleviate the 
unfamiliarity while expanding the limits on how we achieve 
the objective. 
Improvements in targeting methodology are rooted in 
translating the objectives to realistic effects. These 
effects must then be evaluated to determine which targets 
can achieve those effects. These targets must now be 
evaluated to see all the influences working on those 
targets. To that end, we developed a cause-effect 
relational model (see Figure 5) from the links and nodes 
relation model described earlier. The use of this model as 
a framework for instructing student will aid in 
comprehension and can stimulate synergistic thinking.  
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Figure 5.   A Cause-Effect Nodal Model with IW affecters 
created by the author. 
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Improvements in IW targeting integration are related 
to the amount of time spent on the subject. A more thorough 
treatment of how to integrate IW targeting into traditional 
targeting will be provided. Adding a discussion on the 
synchronization matrix to the course would be beneficial.  
Improvement in laboratory work and time are related to 
optimizing the use of student time. Additional lab work 
involving hands-on experience conducting targeting in 
support of IW in a classified environment would be most 
beneficial. These labs would allow the students access to 
intelligence material needed to conduct IW targeting. 
Discussions are underway with JIOC and Sandia National 
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